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TITLE VII-SPOUSAL PREGNANCY BENEFITS-DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF SPOUSAL BENEFITS VIOLATES TITLE
VII. Newport News Shipbmlding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct.
2622 (1983).
To comply with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of
1978, 1 which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 2 an employer
expanded its health insurance plan to provide its female employees
with the same hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-related conditions
as were provided for other medical conditions. Employees' spouses,
however, received pregnancy-related benefits that were less extensive
than the benefits received by spouses for other disabilities. 3 A male
employee filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), 4 alleging that the employer's refusal to provide
full insurance coverage for pregnancy-related hospitalization for his
wife violated EEOC guidelines interpreting the PDA. 5 The employer
I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1980). The text of the PDA in pertinent

2.

3.
4.

5.

part states that:
The terms 'because of' or 'on the basis of' sex include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work . . . .
Id. at § 2000e(k).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, appears at §§ 701716. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
Section 703(a)(i) of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (1982),
and states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin." Id.
Section 703(a)(ii) of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(ii) (1982),
and states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2622-23
(1983).
The EEOC was established to interpret and administer Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-4 to -5 (1976). In addition to investigating charges of discrimination, id.
§ 2000e-5(b), and bringing civil actions in federal court to compel compliance
with Title VII, id. § 2000e-5(f)(i), the EEOC publishes guidelines reflecting the
Agency's interpretation of the controlling statutes. I d. § 2000e-5(e). These guidelines, while not having the force oflaw, are entitled to consideration by the courts.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2626
(1983). After passage of the PDA, and before the effective date of the employer's
plan, the EEOC issued interpretive guidelines in the form of questions and answers. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1982). The answers to questions 21 and 22 reflected the EEOC's position on employee spousal pregnancy. Essentially, these
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then challenged the EEOC's guidelines in federal district court, and the
EEOC, in tum, filed suit against the employer alleging sex discrimination against male employees in the employer's provision of benefits.
The district court dismissed the EEOC's complaint, holding that the
PDA applied only to female employees and not to spouses of male employees. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed, finding that the plan provided less inclusive spousal
benefits to male employees and thus discriminated against males. 7 After rehearing en bane, the court's decision was affirmed. 8 The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the pregnancy limitation in the employer's
amended plan discriminated against male employees in violation of Title VII, because the plan gave full spousal benefits to female employees,
but only partial coverage to male employees simply because of their
sex. 9 The Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the PDA, overturned the holding of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 10 that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a health insurance plan did
not constitute sex discrimination. Additionally, the Court continued,
Congress rejected the reasoning of Gilbert that differential treatment of
pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination. II
Sex discrimination in the United States has a long, well-documented history. I 2 While the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 13 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment I 4 safe-

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.

12.

13.
14.

answers posited that an employer who provides dependent medical benefits must
cover the spouses of both males and females equally, including pregnancy-related
expenses. Id. § 1604, app. at 140.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66,71 (E.D.
Va. 1981), rev'd, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affdpercuriam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.
1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451 (4th
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 113, 114 (4th
Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2627
(1983).
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2627
(1983). Under Gilbert, for discrimination to be gender-based and thus violative of
Title VII, the line between the favored and the disfavored groups must be drawn
strictly on the basis of gender: male versus female. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137-38.
Gilbert further held that pregnancy was not a sex-based attribute, but merely an
additional risk peculiar to females, and that to compensate for this risk would give
females an additional benefit. Id. at 139.
See generally Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877 (1967); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment:
An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J.
671.
The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV,§ l.
The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw . . . . " U.S. CoNsT.
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guard against discrimination, their protection is limited to barring discriminatory practices of a state or of the federal government. In the
wake of the civil violence of the early 1960's, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 15 was passed in 1964 barring, for the first time in the public
sector, discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. 16 The essential purpose of Title VII is to protect an individual from being treated
differently simply because he or she is a member of a sex-defined
group. 17 Title VII's underlying policy - fairness to the individual
rather than fairness to a class 18 - is implemented in part by prohibiting discrimination with resrect to compensation, terms, privileges, or
conditions of employment. 1 While the statute itself speaks in terms of
"compensation," courts have accepted that for Title VII purposes, total
compensation includes fringe benefits, 20 and that Title VII's protection
of fringe benefits applies equally to male and female employees?'
While Title VII was clearly intended to eliminate discrimination in
employment based upon sex, the parameters of the term "sex" were not
delineated in Title VII, and it was uncertain whether differential treatment based upon pregnancy was to be equated with sex discrimina-

15.
16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

21.

amend. V. The due process clause of the fifth amendment has been interpreted to
bar discrimination by the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
See supra note 2. For purposes of Title VII, "employer" is defined as a person
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1982). Title VII was amended in 1972 to cover state and local governments. ld
§ 2000e(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1973).
See, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976) (male
employee challenged retirement benefits); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d
Cir. 1975) (male employee may allege sex discrimination in retirement benefits),
rev'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, 442
F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (male challenged company's policy of using only females as
flight attendants), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Developments in the LawEmployment Discrimination and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1109, 1172-74 (1971).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). This policy was articulated in Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-11 (1978). Relying on
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971), the Court in Manhart adopted as a fundamental principle ofTitle VII
the premise that employment decisions cannot be predicated upon stereotypical
assumptions about characteristics of males or females. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
For a discussion of the principles established by Manhart, see Comment, Title VII
and Sex Discrimination, 3 GLENDALE L. REv. 141, 153-54 (1979).
See supra note 2 for pertinent text of Title VII.
See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1978); Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896
(7th Cir. 1973); Pedraya v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936
(D. Colo. 1979).
See EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978); Rosen v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
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tion. 22 In its formal 1972 guidelines, however, the EEOC took the
position that an employment practice that discriminates on the basis of
pregnancy is a primafacie violation of Title VII. 23 During the next four
years, these guidelines were generally adhered to by federal courts addressing this issue.24
The Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 25
however, sharply reversed this trend in the case law. 26 In Gilbert, women employees alleged that their company's disability plan discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, because the plan
provided sickness and accident benefits, but excluded from coverage
disabilities resulting from ~regnancyY The Supreme Court rejected
the 1972 EEOC guidelines, 8 and held that this exclusion did not constitute sex-based discrimination under Title VII. 29 In reaching this decision, the Court noted that Congress had not defined "discrimination"
in Title VII. 30 The Court, therefore, looked to the concept of discrimination as it had developed in equal protection analysis, reasoning that
both this analysis and Title VII were intended to alleviate similar
concems. 31
As a starting point in developing its Title VII analysis, the Gilbert
Court found instructive a factually similar equal protection clause case.
In Geduldig v. Aiello, 32 a California state disability plan that excluded
pregnancy-related disabilities was found to be constitutional. The
Geduldig Court reasoned that since the plan drew a line between "pregnant women and non-pregnant persons," it did not discriminate on the
basis of sex, as the latter group contained both males and females. 33
The Court declared that the program did "not exclude anyone from
22. See Note, Fourth Circuit Review-Employee Pregnancies, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
620, 621 (1980). The uncertainty concerning employee pregnancies can be attributed in part to the stereotypes associated with females, who were seen as temporary workers, and in part to the lack of legislative history of the sex provision of
Title VII. Id. at 621 n.4.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973).
24. See Comment, Spousal Benefits and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 13
SETON HALL L. REv. 323, 327 (1983); see, e.g., Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), affd in part, vacated in part, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976);
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976).
25. 429 u.s. 125 (1976).
26. See Barkett, Pregnancy Discrimination--Purpose, Effect and Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 401, 413-33 (1978); Comment, supra note 24, at 327.
27. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127-28.
28. Id. at 142-45. The Court determined that the EEOC guidelines had only limited
authority, were not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, and were contradictory to both earlier EEOC guidelines and to § 703(h) of Title VII (Equal
Pay Act).
29. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
30. Id at 133.
31. Id.

32. 417 u.s. 484 (1974).
33. Id. at 497 n.20.
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benefit eligibility because of gender, but merely remove[ d) one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities." 34
The Gilbert Court relied primarily on a footnote in the Geduldig
opinion, which it interpreted as showing that pregnancy exclusions in
disability plans do not discriminate on the basis of sex. 35 The Gilbert
Court stressed that there was no risk from which men were protected
by the plan and women were not, 36 and reiterated Geduldigs emphasis
on the division of the plan's recipients into groups of "pregnant women
and non-pregnant persons.' 037 The Court determined that since the
benefit plan covered the same categories of disabilities equally for both
sexes, it did not discriminate on the basis of sex. 38 Finding that pregnancy was not a sex-based attribute, but merely an additional risk peculiar to women, the Gilbert Court felt that to reimburse female
employees for pregnancy-related disabilities would give them an unfair
benefit in violation of Title VII.3 9 In a strong dissent, however, Justice
Brennan rejected the majority's characterization of the pregnancy exclusion as gender-neutral, arguing that a pregnancy-based distinction
was "strongly sex-related.''40 He was similarly dissatisfied with the
classification of pregnancy as an additional risk. 41
Congressional response 42 to Gilbert came in the form of the PDA,
which broadened the meaning of "sex discrimination" under Title VII
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 496 n.20.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35; see Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 151-53.
Judicial response to Gilbert is exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). In Satty, an employer required
pregnant employees to take a leave of absence, during which the employee was
not entitled to sick pay and lost all accumulated job seniority. Id. at 137. The
Court held that the denial of sick pay was not violative of Title VII, as the program was "legally indistinguishable" from the disability plan upheld in Gilbert.
Id. at 143. The seniority program, however, was found to be prima facie violative
of Title VII. The Court, using a benefit/burden analysis, reasoned that although,
under Gilbert, section 703(a)(i) of Title VII did not require the extension of greater
fringe benefits to women, section 703(a)(ii) similarly does not permit burdening
women by limiting the availability of employment opportunities. Id. at 141-42;
see supra note 2 for text of§ 703(a)(i)-(ii). The Court, other than claiming that the
difference between the denial of benefits and the imposition of a burden is "more
than one of semantics," provided no guidance in how to distinguish between the
two. Salty, 434 U.S. at 142. Thus, after Salty, differential treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities was sometimes violative of Title VII and sometimes not,
a paradox evident throughout subsequent litigation in this field. See Allen &
Powers, Sex Discrimination-Court Narrows Gilbert-Some Pregnancy Discrimination is Sex Related, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 295 (1978). Mitchell v. Board of Trustees
of Pickens County School Dist., 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965
(1979), exemplifies the confusion created by Satty in the Fourth Circuit. For a
discussion of Mitchell, see Note, Fourth Circuit Review-Employee Pregnancies, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 620 (1980).
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to include differential treatment of an individual "because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."43 Thus,
Congress expressly made discrimination on the basis of pregnancy an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII, and accordingly, an
employee's pregnancy must be treated the same as any other disability
under a fringe benefit program.
The issue of whether differential treatment of spousal pregnancz
benefits would violate Title VII, however, remained unsettled.
Neither the legislative history of the PDA, nor case law subsequent to
the Act, clearly established whether differential treatment of spousal
pregnancy benefits was precluded by the PDA. The legislative history
of the PDA is contradictory and inconclusive, lending support both to
the proposition that exclusion of spousal pregnancy benefits violates
Title VII, and to the proposition that it does not. 45 Construing nearly
identical benefit plans, four federal district courts held that the exclusion of spousal pregnancy benefits did not violate Title VII, 46 while one
held that it did. 47
43. See supra note 1 for the pertinent text of the PDA.
44. Outside the ambit of pregnancy benefits, the issue of spousal benefits had been
squarely met, and courts had uniformly found that disparity in the provision of
spousal benefits based on the sex of the employee violates Title VII. See
Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Colby
College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1146 (1st Cir. 1978); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1973). Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal statutes providing less comprehensive fringe benefits to
spouses of female workers than to spouses of male workers discriminate against
the female worker in violation of the equal protection clause. See Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
646-47 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-99 (1973).
45. For legislative materials suggesting that the PDA was not intended to cover
spousal benefits, see SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
AcT OF 1978, at 200-01 (Comm. Print 1980) (remarks of Senator Harrison Williams); 123 CoNG. REc. 29,648 (1977) (remarks by Senator Williams on Act's impact on Income Maintenance Plans). For materials suggesting that the PDA was
intended to include spousal benefits, see 123 CoNG. REc. 29,642, 29,663 (1977)
(remarks of Senators Bayh and Cranston); Proposed Amendment to Title VI/ qfthe
Civil Rights Act ofl964: Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities qfthe House Comm. on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., lst Sess. 187-88 (1977) (remarks of Congressmen Weiss and Sarasin);
Discrimination on the Basis o/Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., lst Sess.
28, 51-52 (1977) (statement of DrewS. Days, III, Assistant Att'y Gen. Civil Rights
Division Just. Dept.). For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the
PDA, see Comment, supra note 24, at 333-36.
46. EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn
Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1469 (7th
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1209 (N.D. Cal. 19.81), aff'd, 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd,
667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affdper curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2622 (1983).
47. United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., CV 81-2121 Lew
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Similarly, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, 48
Seventh, 49 and Ninth5°Circuits heard the issue of differential treatment
of spousal pregnancy on appeal, but reached opposing results. First,
finding that the benefit plan gave fewer benefits to male than to female
employees and therefore violated Title VII, the Fourth Circuit looked
to the language of the PDA. 51 The court found that since spousal coverage is employment-related, and since the statutory language did not
indicate such coverage falls outside the reach of the statute, the language indicated congressional intent to apply the PDA to all employment situations. 52 The Fourth Circuit buttressed its decision by noting
that the PDA refers to "persons" and not to "employees." 53 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, however, determined that the PDA's language
indicated congressional intent to protect only female workers and, accordingly, found that the plans did not discriminate based on sex. 54
Furthermore, while all three courts acknowledged that the issue of
spousal pregnancy benefits was to be decided on "existing Title VII
principles," there was no consensus as to what these principles were.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, consistent with their findings that the
PDA merely carved out a narrow exception to Gilbert for female employees, found that the principles established by Gilbert were left intact. 55 The Fourth Circuit, however, determined that there was no
support for the view that the matter should be decided on the basis of
Title VII as it existed before the PDA, and applied Title VII as
amended by the PDA. 56 The employer's plan was unlawful since the
PDA expressly equated pregnancy-related conditions with sex and the

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

56.

(Gx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1982) (trial court decision), affd, 712 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.
1983).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.),
affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983).
EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 (4th
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983);
see American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (in Title VII cases,
starting point must be the language employed by Congress; legislative purpose is
determined by the ordinary meaning of the words used).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 (4th
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d ll3 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
/d. at 451.
EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469, 1476 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469, 1477-78 (7th Cir. 1983);
EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982).
The basic principles established by Gilbert were that the dividing line between
favored and disfavored groups must be drawn strictly on the td.Sis of gender to
constitute sex discrimination and, hence, that a division into groups of pregnant
women and non-pregnant persons is not discriminatory. See supra notes II & 3539 and accompanying text.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451 (4th
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d ll3 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
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plan contained a pregnancy-based, and hence sex-based, distinction in
its provision of benefits. 57
Recognizing this conflict, the Supreme Court heard on appeal the
Fourth Circuit case, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC. 58 The Supreme Court adopted a two-tiered approach in its
analysis of whether the denial of spousal pregnancy benefits discriminated against males in violation of Title VII. The Court first found that
the PDA did not create merely a narrow exception to Gilbert, but
rather, that it completely overruled the Gilbert rationale that pregnancy
is an additional risk to which only women are liable and that pregnancy discrimination is not sex-based. 59 The Court emphasized congressional dissatisfaction with the Gilbert decision. It noted in
particular those sections of the PDA's legislative history indicating congressional approval of the Gilbert dissent's view that pregnancy discrimination is sex-based discrimination. 60 In light of this legislative
history, the Court found it anomalous that Congress would view an
employee's pregnancy as sex-based, but a spouse's pregnancy as gender-neutral.61
In the second tier of its analysis, the Court examined the meaning
of discrimination under Title VII, without its Gilbert gloss. 62 The Court
first noted that compensation for Title VII purposes includes fringe
benefits such as insurance coverage, 63 and that both sexes are protected
against discrimination. 64 Stressing those sections of the legislative history that enunciated the necessity of reestablishing the principles of Title VII that had existed prior to the Gilbert decision, the Court held that
Gilbert's interpretation of Title VII principles was completely overruled.65 The Court then determined that Title VII principles existing
prior to Gtlbert provided the appropriate test of discrimination under
Title VII. These principles, as developed in Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 66 included a test of discrimination that
would hold invalid a plan treating one person in a manner that, but for
57.
58.
59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

ld.
103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
ld. at 2627.
I d. at 2628. It should be noted that both the Senate and House Reports concluded
that the EEOC's 1972 guidelines correctly interpreted sex discrimination for Title
VII purposes, S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977); H.R. REP. No.
948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 4750, and that Gilbert's dissent accurately interpreted Title VII's sex discrimination provisions. S. REP. at 3-4; H.R. REP. at 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4752-53. The Senate Report stressed that the
spousal benefit question was to be resolved on the basis of existing Title VII principles. S. REP. at 4. It did not, however, enunciate what these principles were.
Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2629.
ld. at 2630.
ld.
ld.
Id. at 2629-30.
435 U.S. 702 (1978); see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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that person's sex, would be different. 67 The Court determined that providing less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses gives married male
employees a less inclusive benefit package than that given to married
female employees. Such a plan, reasoned the Court, would not pass the
test of discrimination enunciated in Manhart, since for no reason other
than the employee's sex, a married female employee received full
spousal coverage, while the married male employee did not. 68
The Court dismissed the employer's argument that Title VII applies only to discrimination against employees and not spouses, finding
that since pregnancy is definitively a sex-based attribute for all Title
VII purposes, discrimination based on pregnancy is, on its face, sex
discrimination. 69 Thus, concluded the Court, if spouses receive less
favorable treatment in the provision of benefits, then the practice actually discriminates against employees who, accordingly, receive a less
inclusive benefit package. 70
The dissent in Newport News, in accord with some of the lower
court holdings/' argued that the language of the PDA indicated that it
applies only to female employees, and that Gilbert's rationale was left
otherwise intact by passage of the Act. 72 Justices Rehnquist and Powell
interpreted the legislative history of the PDA to exclude coverage of
spousal benefits, and largely ignored those sections that expressed congressional dissatisfaction with Gilbert's rationale. 73
Such an interpretation, however, would lead to an irrational result:
for women employees, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would
be sex-based discrimination, while for employees' spouses, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would not be "gender-based discrimination at all." 74 The view of the majority produces a more consistent
result: pregnancy is a sex-based attribute, and pregnancy discrimination is therefore sex discrimination for all Title VII purposes. Furthermore, the Gilbert opinion left in its wake confusion concerning the
principles of Title VIJ.1 5 If, however, as both the Senate and House
reports on the PDA suggest, the Gilbert dissent accurately reflects the
congressional viewpoint on Title VII principles, the reasoning of the
Gilbert majority must have been legislatively eradicated by the PDA
and with it G1lbert's own peculiar analysis of existing Title VII principles.76 Newport News replaces Gilbert's emphasis on groups of persons
1984]
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Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2630-31 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711).
Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
/d. at 2631.
/d. at 2631-32.
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Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
/d. at 2636 n.7.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
See supra notes 11, 18 & 42.
See supra note 55.
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with Manhart's focus on the individual as the underlying principle for
Title VII analysis.
The economic impact of extending coverage to employees' spouses
is difficult to estimate, as there are currently no available studies on the
extent to which employee medical plans exclude or limit spousal pregnancy benefits. 77 Plainly, extending pregnancy benefits to dependent
spouses will make more comprehensive insurance coverage available to
greater numbers of women. Studies indicate, however, that the effect of
applying the PDA to spouses may vary according to the socio-economic characteristics of the women benefited so that groups already
receiving a substantial amount of coverage would benefit most. 78 It
may, however, help to alleviate the unequal distribution of health insurance in the absence of a national health insurance plan. 79 Moreover, the Newport News opinion, although directed at discrimination
against males, further weakens stereotypical views of the role of women
in society. 80 In addition to these social benefits, and perhaps of more
general importance, Newport News reaffirms Title VII principles that
emphasize the individual as the focus of Title VII legislation.
Mari Stanley

77. See Kohn, Can Men Be .Discriminated Against on the Basis o/ Pregnancy?: The
Pregnancy .Discrimination Acto/ 1978 and its Application in Newport, 14 CoLUM.
HuM. RTs. L. REv. 383, 424-27 (1983).
78. Id at 427-29.
79. Id at 428.
80. See supra note 22; see also Comment, .D!!ferentia/ Treatment o/ Pregnancy in Employment: The Impact ofGenera1 Elec. Co. v. Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 717, 724 (1978) (Gilbert Court sees child-rearing, and not employment, as woman's proper role); Comment, Title V/1· Are Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 13 TuLSA L.J. 102, 124 (1977) (Court relies on sexrole stereotypes of women as weak and vulnerable because of their reproductive
functions).

